The Council on Foreign Relations’ (CFR) new Climate Realism Initiative, led by Senior Fellow Varun Sivaram1, presents itself as a pragmatic framework for US climate policy. Although its name suggests a clear-eyed approach to complex global challenges, the initiative actually reframes high emissions as a national security threat requiring every tool to be deployed from “economic coercion to military might.” Ted Nordhaus, co-founder of the Breakthrough Institute, argues in his sharp critique, the initiative’s “realism” is a deceptive veneer; underneath, climate risks are amplified to justify extreme, interventionist policies. By cloaking radical proposals in pragmatic rhetoric, the CFR initiative misleads policymakers and promotes a dangerous, militarized approach to climate policy. Let’s take a look at the CFR initiative, Nordhaus’s critique, and the implications of legitimizing force to reduce emissions outside national borders.

The Climate Realism Initiative ought to be taken seriously; it is no mere think-tank exercise—it aims to reframe climate policy as a pillar of US interventionist power. The CFR’s influence on US foreign policy should not be underestimated nor dismissed; from shaping the Marshall Plan to providing the intellectual scaffolding for NAFTA and many other policies, the CFR has long been a place to ferment and cultivate foreign policy ideas. As will be discussed below, the focus on energy innovation and adaptation could shape future administrations, but more concerning is the securitization of emissions: framing non-compliant nations as security threats. Shockingly, Sivaram declares:

“foreign emissions are endangering the American homeland.”

How does he arrive at that conclusion?

Sivaram’s Climate Realism Initiative outlines four fallacies of climate policy thinking and then presents three pillars of a new “doctrine” to guide foreign policymakers. He acknowledges that limiting global warming to 1.5 or 2 degrees Celsius is likely unattainable; reducing US emissions are “largely irrelevant to global climate change” because the heavy emitters are China, India, and other BRICS+ countries; the risks from climate change are not manageable; and the clean energy transition is not a win-win for the United States because of Chinese dominance in all spheres of transition related technologies and supply chains. Nordhaus contends that while he welcomes recognition of the “realist” fallacies and some of the solutions proposed, it is the third pillar in Sivaram’s proposed solutions that raised a red flag which he felt compelled to address. Nordhaus writes,

“But then climate realism goes so far off the rails, embracing a hysterical and deeply regressive vision for America’s role in the world and response to climate change, that I not only cannot endorse it but feel a duty to speak out against it.”

What are the three pillars and what is it about the third pillar that has Nordhaus so concerned?

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The initiative’s first pillar, preparing for a world “blowing through” climate targets, lays the groundwork for coercion—economic or military—by inflating climate risks. Sivaram claims increased emissions cause climate change which worsens natural disasters, migration, and resource competition, justifying central planning and forceful actions under a national security guise. Nordhaus disputes this claim, noting there is “little evidence that climate change has much intensified most climatic extremes” and that mortality from climate-related events has “fallen precipitously.” The initiative’s reliance on speculative modeling and alarmist narratives, backed by billions in environmental philanthropy, distorts science to paint emissions as existential threats. This crisis mentality based on “low probability and speculative climate risks”, as Nordhaus argues, is being used as a “justification for the American military to enforce climate austerity on the global poor.”

The second pillar, “Invest in globally competitive clean technology industries,” reflects Sivaram’s experience as a physicist and solar tech entrepreneur. He advocates for government “investments”—essentially subsidies—to drive American innovation in emerging clean technologies, rather than trying to enter into existing markets that China already dominates like batteries, wind, solar, and related supply chains. While Nordhaus tentatively agrees that investing in such innovation is important, it is the next pillar that elicited the warning bells.

The third pillar, “Lead international efforts to avert truly catastrophic climate change,” proposes an America-led emissions driven climate crusade. Sivaram recommends that the US spearhead global development and enforcement of climate measures. This includes developing and testing (as a “last resort”) geoengineering solutions through an international coalition and deterring other nations from unilateral geoengineering projects like solar dimming; and aggressive trade tools such as emissions based tariffs or sanctions, a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), or some other form of “climate club”. Such aggressive trade policies, particularly CBAMs, risk excluding or penalizing developing nations unable to meet stringent criteria, exacerbating economic divides.

CBAMs, central to the initiative, are particularly insidious. Framed as tools to incentivize decarbonization, they tax imports based purely on embedded emissions, disproportionately targeting developing nations reliant on carbon-intensive industries and reliable affordable hydrocarbon energy. Nordhaus rightly labels them a coercive cudgel, penalizing countries like Brazil, India, or South Africa for prioritizing economic growth. The initiative’s security framing also suggests a slippery slope: If CBAMs fail, sanctions or military posturing could follow. While direct intervention over emissions is improbable due to diplomatic and domestic barriers, normalizing this rhetoric legitimizes coercive escalation, echoing historical US interventions under security pretexts.

Alarmingly, Sivaram’s rhetoric escalates to dangerous heights, claiming that because of costly weather events like floods, fires, and storms discussed in the first pillar,

foreign emissions are endangering the American homeland...the effects resemble those if China or Indonesia were to launch missiles at the United States.

He suggests that

Let that sink in. If moral suasion and peer pressure is not enough to compel countries to commit economic suicide by foregoing reliable affordable energy in order to reduce emissions, then western countries led by the United States will be morally justified to not only initiate aggressive economic penalties, such as emissions-based tariffs and sanctions, but also to ultimately engage in military action to force emissions reduction. This comparison of emissions to acts of war is not only hyperbolic but profoundly reckless; it is justifying military intervention in the name of emissions and climate policy. Nordhaus rightly warns that such belligerent posturing undermines global cooperation, risking conflict with major emitter nations like China or India, alienating the Global South, and casting the US as an aggressor rather than a partner.

The implications of this initiative are significant. Equating foreign emissions to acts of aggression invites a securitized and militarized view of emissions and climate policy. This mindset could justify pre-emptive economic sanctions or military actions, alienating developing nations already skeptical of Western climate agendas. Furthermore, it distracts from practical measures like disaster preparedness or energy diversification, misallocating resources to speculative or confrontational strategies like geoengineering. By masking radical policies as realism, this initiative could mislead policymakers into endorsing measures that destabilize international relations. Climate clubs or CBAMs may marginalize poorer nations, while geoengineering oversight, led by the US, risks global ecological and diplomatic consequences. Nordhaus’s critique underscores the need for humility and cooperation, not an interventionist agenda masked by realist rhetoric.

The initiative’s “Climate Realism” branding is thus dangerously misleading, packaging securitization of emissions and climate policies as pragmatic solutions. Nordhaus emphasizes that climate change, while serious, does not warrant equating emissions with warfare or embracing untested geoengineering. A truly realist approach would focus on adaptation, resilient infrastructure, market-driven innovation, and diplomatic engagement, not coercive crusades.

American policymakers must reject this climate crusade. True climate leadership requires fostering global partnerships, not wielding threats. Nordhaus’s call for rational policymaking is urgent: Sivaram’s reckless framing threatens to turn climate action into a militarized global conflict. By embracing balanced strategies and collaboration, America can lead without resorting to the dangerous folly of green imperialism.